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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner,

Case No.

vs.

8937

JAMES L. HATCH and DELLA L.
HATCH,
Respondents.

RESPOND·ENTS1 REPLY TO
STATE OF UTAH 1S PETITION
FOR RE.HEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The State of Utah's Petition for rehearing and reconsideration of this case should be denied for the followmg reasons:
I.
THE PETITION FAILS TO STATE ANY
GROUNDS UPON WHICH A REHEARING COULD
PROPERLY BE GRANTED.
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II.
A DECISION RENDERED BY FOUR JUDGES
IN A CASE HEARD BY A FULL COURT DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHERE
THE OTHER JUDGE DIED AFTER THE HEARING
AND BEFORE THE DECISION.
III.
EXCHANGES OF THE KIND INVOLVED HERE
LOGICALLY CAN BE MADE EITHER UNDER SECTION 65-1-27 OR SECTION 65-1-70.
IV.
PETITIONER'S COMMENTS AS TO ACTION
TAKEN BY 1959 LEGISLATURE ARE MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE IGNORED.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PETITION FAILS TO STATE ANY
GROUNDS UPON WHICH A REHEARING COULD
PROPERLY BE GRANTED.
The State's brief fails to raise any new points relative
to the merits of this case or to cite any significant new
authority. It is principally comprised of a re-argument
of points and authorities which were thoroughly briefed
and argued when the case was first submitted to the
Court. From a reading of the majority and dissenting
opinions, and from the fact that the Court had the matter under advisement for almost ten months before rendering a decision, it is evident that all these points and
arguments were carefully considered. In essence, therefore, the State's position is that the Court nevertheless
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reached the wrong conclusion. It now seeks another opportunity to repeat the old arguments and authorities in
the hope that the Court will reverse itself. While the
reasons for the State's desire for a rehearing are apparent
and understandable, it is equally clear that this desire alone,
unsupported as it is by anything new, will not justify the
granting of a rehearing. In Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah
483, 11 Pac. 618 ( 1886), the Court in denying a petition
for rehearing said:
The Petition for rehearing states no new
facts or grounds for a reversal of the judgment of
the lower court. It is mainly a re-argument of the
case. We have repeatedly .called attention to the
fact that no rehearing will be granted where nothing new and important is offered for our consideration. We again say that we cannot grant a
rehearing unless a strong showing therefor be made.
A re-argument, or an argument with the Court
upon the points of the decision, with no new light
given, is not such a showing.
The fact that the decision was rendered by only four
judges, occasioned by the death of Judge Worthen in the
interval between the hearing and the decision, does not
afford a valid basis for granting a rehearing. See State
v. Sioux Falls Brewing Co., 5 S.D. 360, 58 N.W. 928
(1894). There the South Dakota Supreme Court denied
a petition for rehearing which was based upon the intervening death of one of the judges who sat at the hearing
and said in part:
To recognize the change in personnel of the court
as alone sufficient to require a re-argument would
lead to the conclusion that intermediate the death
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of Judge Bennett and the qualification of Judge
Fuller this court could not decide any case, although the surviving judges were agreed as to its
decision. There seems to us no good reason for such
a conclusion.
The dissent by one of the surviving judges in this
case is not a point of distinction from the Sioux Falls
Brewing case because the surviving judges who joined in
the majority opinion would have controlled the decision
even had the deceased judge joined in the dissent.
The State's contention that a decision by less than a
full Court, absent a stipulation of the parties, violates
Article VIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution-a contention which does not go to the merits of the case-is
discussed below in Point II.
The only other reason given by the State to justify
its Petition for rehearing is the following one stated in the
conclusion of its brief:
[T]he issues in this case have far reaching significance and importance. At stake is nothing less
than the right of the citizens of the State of Utah
to a royalty interest in oil and gas and other mineral
properties worth many millions of dollars. The
chief beneficiaries of such rights are the public
schools of the state, in part supported by the revenues from state school sections involved in this
dispute.
While the State concedes that ((these considerations alone
should not :~.~- :~.~- :>.'- be determinative of the outcome of
the case" it concludes that uthey do constitute good reason why this Court should arrive at a final judgment
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only after the most thorough and thoughtful judicial
consideration of the issues presented."
This contention is wholly without merit. There are
few cases which have been decided by this Court and
which have been as thoroughly briefed and argued. A
total of six briefs were filed before the hearing and were
available to the Court in reaching its decision. This total
included three briefs prepared by the State (Appellant's
brief, Appellant's reply brief and Appellant's reply to
Amicus Curiae brief) and two briefs Amicus Curiae. At
the hearing, oral arguments were made not only by counsel
for Respondents and the Appellant, but also by counsel
representing the United States as well as Honolulu Oil
Corporation and The Superior Oil Company, the two
Amicus Curiae. Thereafter, the Court considered the matter for almost ten months before rendering its decision.
The lengthy dissenting opinion, which discusses all the
issues involved in the case, and the carefully written majority opinion demonstrate that the Court considered the
case carefully and in detail.
II.
A DECISIO·N RENDERED BY FOUR JUDGES
IN A CASE HEARD BY A FULL COURT DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHERE
THE OTHER JUDGE DIED AFTER THE HEARING
AND BEFORE THE DECISION.
In its POINT IV, the State cites Article VIII, Section
2, of the Utah Constitution* for the proposition that a
*"~e supreme court shall consist of fi~e judges, which number may

be mcreased or decreased by the legtslature, but no alteration or
increase shall have the effect of removing a judge from office. A major-
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decision by the Utah Supreme Court must be by five
judges, and not four judges. It is contended that the· provision that ((if a justice of the supreme court shall be
disq'ualified from sitting in a cause before said court, the
remaining judges shall call a district judge to sit with
them on the hearing of such cause" makes such an interpretation mandatory, despite additional language in this
section to the effect that u[a] majority of the judges constituting the court shall be necessary to form a quorum
or render a decision." It is submitted that this construction is unwarranted.
Clearly a decision by a quorum of less than five
justices was contemplated. The language of this section
must be so interpreted if all of its provisions are to be
given effect.
Similar constitutional provisions have been given this
interpretation consistently by courts in other jurisdictions. E.g. Dolley v. Ragon, 76 Cal. App. 140, 243 Pac.
893 (1926) (A quorum of two on a Supreme Court
regularly composed of three justices was permitted to act
despite Cal. Const. Art. VI, Section 3: ulf a vacancy
occur in the office of a justice, the Governor shall appoint
ity of the judges constituting the court shall be necessary to form a
quorum or render a decision. If a justice of the supreme court shall
be disqualified from sitting in a cause before said court, the remaining
judges shall call a district judge to sit with them on the hearing of
such cause. Every judge of the supreme court shall be at least thirty
years of age, an active member of the bar, in good standing, learned
in the law, and a resident of the State of Utah for the five years next
preceding his selection. The judge having the shortest term to serve,
not holding his office by selection to :fill a vacancy before expiration
of a regular term, shall be the chief justice, and shall preside at all
terms of the Supreme Court, and in case of his absence, the judge,
having in like manner, the next shortest term, shall preside in his
stead." (As amended November 7, 1944, effective January 1, 1945;)
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a person to hold the office until the election and qualification of a justice to fill the vacancy.") Furthermore, this
Constitutional provision could not preclude a decision by
a mere quorum of the Court in those situations where one
judge present at the hearing of the cause does not participate in its decision by reason of his intervening death,
because it provides only for the calling of a district judge
to usit" on the ((hearing" of the case.

A. The quorum requirement.
The Petitioner argues that although the Constitution
provides that a mere majority of the Supreme Court
justices shall constitute a quorum, it is nevertheless not
constitutionally possible for a lesser number than five to
render a decision in any cause, except upon stipulation of
the parties. It must therefore also be the contention of
the Petitioners that absent such a stipulation the powers
of a quorum would be limited to routine daily transactions
dealing with the administrative functions of the Court.
But where the meaning of the word ((quorum" has been
placed in question, it has not been so interpreted. In
Snider v. Rinehart, 18 Colo. 18, 31 Pac. 716 (1892) the
court was squarely faced with the determination of
whether a ((quorum" as provided in Colorado Constitution
Article VI, Section 5 Ccthe Supreme Court shall consist
of three judges, a majority of whom shall be necessary to
form a quorum or pronounce a decision."), would be permitted to decide a case in the absence of one of its members. The word's etymological derivation was considered
and it was concluded that it refers to the number of persons who may lawfully act. The .court noted that the
language of the Colorado Constitution was substantially
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similar to the language regulating the United States Supreme Court, which provides that the court shall be composed of nine judges with a quorum of six entitled to act
and then said:
Hence, if the construction contended for by
appellant be correct, then the United States Supreme Court can never transact any business during
a vacancy occasioned by the death or resignation
of any one of the nine judges provided for by the
act constituting said court. It is a matter of common information that numerous vacancies have
occurred in that body during the last quarter of a
century, and such vacancies have continued for
months at a time, and yet during the period of
such vacancies, the court has gone on exercising
it full jurisdiction in the decision of pending cases.
A vacancy is liable to occur at any time in this
court. Such vacancy may continue weeks or even
months * * *. The consequences might be very
serious if the court were to be held practically
disorganized or incapacitated from transacting
business during such vacancy. Fortunately, there
seems to be no good reason for arriving at such
conclusion.
The holding of the Utah court in Nephi Irrigatio1t Co. v.
]e11kins, 8 Utah 452, 32 Pac. 699 (1893) (discussed below) is consistent with the position adopted in Colorado.

B. T be general effect of death or other disqualification upon the pou/crs of a judicial body to act.
Petitioners correctly cite In re Tbompson's Estate, 72
Utah 17, 86, 269 Pac. 103, 128 (1928) for the proposition
uthat (disqualification' may include the death of a judge."
They then incorrectly, and without citing authorities supporting their contention, assert that such a udisquali:fica-
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tion" has the effect of incapacitating the court in
determining any cause previously heard and yet pending
before it. The numerous following cited cases stand in
contradiction of Petitioner's contention. No case involving
the question has been found which supports Petitioner's
contention.
In Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Jenkins, supra, in interpreting 25 U.S. St. at Large, p. 203::·, it was held that the
quorum requirement related only to the number of justices who must be present when action was to be taken
and the power of the Court to render a decision was not
impaired even though at the time of decision a judge,
whose presence was necessary to form a quorum, was disqualified to participate in the decision because he had
tried the case below.
In rejecting the contention that the disqualified judge
could not be used to form a quorum, and in holding that
the two qualified judges could effectively decide the case
even though, alone, they would not have comprised a
quorum, the Court stated:
[A] ny other construction would render the court
powerless to act in many cases brought before it.
Under the contention claimed by respondent the
sickness or absence of one of the justices would
render it impossible to obtain a quorum so as to
transact business, although it would be competent
for two concurring justices, when three constitute
a quorum, to render an opinion. If the disqualified

---

''"The supreme court consists of a chief justice and three associate
justices, any three of whom shall constitute a quorum, but no justice
sha~l act as a member of the supre~e court in any action or procedmg brought to .s~ch ~ourt by wnt of error, bill of exception, or
appeal from a declSlon, JUdgment, or decree rendered by him as a
judge of the district court."
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justice cannot constitute one of the quorum without acting, the two remaining justices would be
powerless to act.
See also Ets-Hokin v. Appellant Department of Superior
Court, 42 Cal. App. 2d 326, 108 P. 2d 943 (1941) (Only
two of three judges heard the cause) ; Dolley v. Ragon,
supra (cause heard by three judges, one of whom deemed
himself disqualified); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
People, 68 Colo. 487, 190 Pac. 513 (1920); Snider v.
Rinehart, supra, (case decided during vacancy due to resignation of one judge); Stanton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.,
25 Wyo. 138, 167 Pac. 709 (1917); Gibbs v. Milk Control
Board, 185 Ga. 844, 196 S. E. 296 (1936); State v. Neu,
180 La. 545, 157 So. 105 (1934); Platt v. Shields, 96 Vt.
257, 119 Ad. 520 (1923); International & Longshoremans' & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D.
Pa. 1949) reversed on other grounds, 187 F. 2d 860, cert
den. 342 U. S. 859; Eagerton v. Graves, 252 Ala. 326, 40
So. 2d 417 (1949); CQ'mmonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa.
33, 16 A. 2d 50 (1940); Commonwealth v. Gregory, 146
A. 2d 624 (Penn. 1958). Cf. Bracey v. Gray, 71 Cal. App.
2d 206, 162 P. 2d 314 (1945) (district court of appeal
which is regularly composed of three members is not
illegally constituted if one is disqualified, since only two
are necessary to render a decision) .
The rule established by these cases permitting a court
to act following the disqualification of one of its members,
if a quorum is otherwise present (or in the case of Nephi
Irrigation Co. v. Jenkins where the disqualified member is
necessary to form a quorum) is not changed by provisions
for the designation of a judge to take the place of one
who is incapacitated. Dolley v. Ragon; supra, Johnson v.
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Walls, 18 5 Ga. 177, 194 S. E. 380; /¥-etropolitan: Water
Dist. v. Adams, 19 Cal. 2d 463, 122 P. 2d 257 (1942).
C. The State has impliedly consented to a decision
by four judges.
If, despite the clear weight of the above case law to
the contrary, it were to be determined that there is some
legal merit in the State's present claims, it nevertheless
appears that the State would be unable to raise such a
contention at this time. The disqualification by death
which the State now complains of occurred approximately
four months prior to the announcement of the Court's
decision. If the State of Utah objected to the remaining
members of the Supreme Court deciding the case, it was
incumbent that it make its objections known promptly
and its silence during the interim can only be construed
as an implied consent that the surviving four judges decide. In Stanton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 25 Wyo. 138,
167 Pac. 709 (1917) the court was faced with a similar
situation. In disposing of a petition for rehearing on the
grounds that the cause was heard by only two of three
justices, the court observed that it was originally argued
before only two justices and that the plaintiff was aware
of the illness of the third judge. When the judge died
without having opportunity to participate in the court's
decision, the court held on the petition for rehearing that
the action of the petitioner would preclude him from
objecting in view of his knowledge of the situation.
Similarly, in this case the State had knowledge of the
((disqualification" of one of the Judges long before the
Court's decision was announced. Its delay in raising an
objection until after the opinion had been announced indi-
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cates that it objects only to the manner in which the case
was resolved, and not to the composition of the court. The
State's delay must now preclude it raising this argument
merely to obtain a rehearing on the merits.

III.
EXCHANGES OF THE KIND INVOLVED HERE
LOGICALLY CAN BE MADE EITHER UNDER SECTION 65-1-27 OR SECTION 65-1-70.
The State's brief, by a rather involved and unconvincing process of reasoning, infers that the Court's conclusion that the State Land Board had authority to make
exchanges of the kind involved here was based solely upon
§ 65-1-14 U. C. A. 1953. This inference was drawn notwithstanding the clear statement of the court that nsuch
authority must be found in §§ 65-1-14, 65-1-27, and
65-1-70 U. C. A. 1953." Having eliminated, to its satisfaction, §§ 65-1-27 and 65-1-70, the State then argues as
if no other statute than § 65-1-14 was involved. The
State's self interest in this litigation has blinded it to the
fact that either § 65-1-27 or § 65-1-70 can be reasonably
interpreted as authorizing and permitting these exchanges.

A. The provisions of Section 65-1-27 authorize the
State to exchange lands with the United States.
Section 65-1-27 U. C. A. 1953 provides as follows:
Selection of state lands-Relinquishment.-All selections of land shall be made in legal subdivisions
according to the United States survey, and when a
selection has been made and approved by the board,
it shall take such action as may be necessary to
secure the approval of the proper officer of the
United States and the final transfer to this state of
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the lands selected. The board may cancel, relinquish or release the claims of the state to, and may
reconvey to the United States, any particular tract
of land erroneously listed to the state, or any tract
upon which, at the ~ime of selection, a bona fide
claim has been initiated by an actual settler.
It is significant that in quoting from § 65-1-27 at page 4
of its brief, the State neglects to quote the first sentence
of the section which, in reference to the making of indemnity selections, directs that the State ((shall take such
action as may be necessary to secure the approval of the
proper officers of the United States and the final transfer
to this State of the lands selected." This section clearly
confers upon the Land Board authority to pass minerals
to the United States in selection exchanges of this kind
since one of the conditions of making a valid selection
under the Federal Statutes is that the State waive all its
rights in the land used as base.
As was pointed out in California v. Desert Water Oil
and Irrigation Company, 243 U. S. 214, 37 S. Ct. 394
(1917) the states had, prior to the decision, consistently
made selections under the Federal school indemnity statutes, both in cases where the base land had and had not
vested in the state, and the case affirmed this right. Section 6 5-1-27 was passed by our Legislature in 18 9 9, several years after the Federal Statutes were passed, and at
a time when the practice of making indemnity selections
had become well established and thereafter selections were
made under it both in cases where title to the base land
had and had not vested in the State. Under these circumstances, the enactment of the statute of May 12, 1919
(§ 65-1-15, U. C. A. 1953), could not, in the absence of
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express language to that effect, be interpreted as preventing
selection exchanges under § 65-1-27. The second sentence
in§ 65-1-27 relating to lands erroneously listed to the State
or on which a bona fide claim has been initiated by an
actual settler which is referred to by the State is obviously
intended to grant additional powers upon the State Land
Board. Grammatically, this language is separated from the
preceding provision referred to, and is in no way intended
to qualify it.

B. The provisions of Section 65-1-70 authorize the
State to exchange lands with the United States.
Section 65-1-70 U. C. A. 1953 provides as follows:
Exchange of lands between board and proprietors.
-In order to compact, as far as practicable, the
land holdings of the state, the board is hereby authorized to exchange any of the land held by the
state for other land of equal value within the state,
held by other proprietors; and upon request of the
board the governor is hereby authorized to execute
and deliver the necessary patents to such other
proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of
the land so exchanged; provided, that no exchange
shall be made by the land board until the patent for
the lands so received in exchange shall have been
issued to such proprietors or their grantors.
It is evident that there are two critical prerequisites to the
application of this section to the exchange of State lands
with the United States: (a) The purpose of the exchange
should be to compact State holdings, and (b) the equivalent of the udeed" or Hpatent" from the United States
or its grantees covering the exchanged land selected should
be involved. Both of these conditions are apparently
satisfied.
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Prior to the time of exchange with the United States,
the subject land was ((hedged in" and isolated within a
national forest. This made the land difficult to use and
unattractive to prospective purchasers from the State. By
entering into the sele.ction exchange involved here, the
State was able to acquire other lands so compacted in
reference to other lands available for use in the State that
they were attractive to prospective purchasers. The chief
value to the State of its lands consists in the producing of
revenue by the sale or lease thereof. With but rare exceptions, the only utilization of State lands is that made
by the State's grantees or lessees. This being true, the fact
that the lands acquired by the State under the selection
were soon sold does not alter the conclusion that the exchange was made to compact the State's land holdings in
the sense above indicated.
There was the equivalent of a ((deed" or ((patent"
covering the Federal government lands involved. Upon and
by virtue of approval of the selection, passing of legal
title as to the base lands from the State to the United
States and as to the selected lands from the United States
to the State was accomplished. This was in accordance
with applicable Federal legislation. It has been repeatedly
held in Interior Department decisions that approval of a
selection passes title to the lands ((as completely as if transferred by patent." See Reid v. State of Mississippi, 30 L.
D. 230 (1900). It is thus apparent that at the time of
the selection exchange, the government of the United
States was the (Cproprietor" within the contemplation of
§ 65-1-70 U. C. A. 1953 and that the approval of the
selection
the equivalent of a deed or patent.

was.
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IV.
PETITIONER'S COMMENTS AS TO ACTION
TAKEN BY THE 1959 LEGISLATURE ARE MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE IGNORED.
In reference to§ 65-1-15 U.C.A. 1953, the Petitioner
correctly notes at page 8 of its brief that the 1959 Session
of the Utah Legislature re-enacted said§ 65-1-15 in Chapter 131, Laws of Utah 1959, adding a provision authorizing the State Land Board to release minerals in the base
lands in selection exchanges with the United States. The
Petitioner fails to note, however, that in Chapter 132
which follows, the same Legislature on the same day reenacted said § 65-1-15 a second time, eliminating the
proviso. Under these circumstances, the comments of
Petitioner as to the significance of what the 1959 Legislature did are meaningless. In any event, it is the province
of this Court, not the Legislature, to interpret the meaning of the applicable statutes, and even had the proviso
not been eliminated by the second re-enactment, the
Court, in interpreting statutory meaning, should attach no
significance to a proviso added by the Legislature approximately four months after the case was argued and submitted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated it is respectfully submitted that the State's Petition for rehearing should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,

OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
Richfield, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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